New customer - greenfield setup
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dave247 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
For basic site filter, would you consider OpenDNS? Then, like Jared said, discipline the employees.
Not employees. So you can't use DNS filtering nor can you discipline. It's about controlling customers. So.... nothing will work.
While primarily for customers - the employees would also be limited...
But yeah - I see the rabbit whole that's being generated here now.
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@jaredbusch said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
These are my thoughts as well, it's one of the draw backs to Ubiquiti gear - limited to 4 VLANs on WiFi (at least used to be).
The limit is 4 SSID. Of course that also means 4 VLAN max, since the VLAN is tied to the SSID. But the limit is not VLAN.
aww - yes, you're starting it right... but clearly you understood my end point.
Thanks for the correction. -
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
but SSL inspection on guest - nope, not interested... Hell I'd be more worried about being sue for breach of privacy.
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
You missed the reality of what I was saying -
I've been on guest wifi networks that sent you to a captive portal and required you to install their SSL cert so you could surf, and they could intercept all your traffic.
I was saying I was unwilling to make that a requirement on this client's network (they haven't asked for it, and I as their current IT wouldn't recommend it if they did).
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@jaredbusch said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
Most common people will simply get the portal, tap anything it says and thus agree to it all. So yeah, you are wrong that no one does it.
Exactly - I have seen this - exactly once - and myself just walked away from that access point.
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@jaredbusch said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
Most common people will simply get the portal, tap anything it says and thus agree to it all. So yeah, you are wrong that no one does it.
Is that all that it takes to get the phone or computer to install the certs and hand over man in the middle access? I've not done it, because... only a crazy person would.... but I thought it took several steps and a lot of warnings from most mobile devices.
Yeah - there are a few warnings... but most people will simply accept it and start surfing - it's crazy... they have no clue what they are giving up. and even worse a surprising number wouldn't care even if you got them to actually understand it.
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@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
but SSL inspection on guest - nope, not interested... Hell I'd be more worried about being sue for breach of privacy.
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
You missed the reality of what I was saying -
I've been on guest wifi networks that sent you to a captive portal and required you to install their SSL cert so you could surf, and they could intercept all your traffic.
I was saying I was unwilling to make that a requirement on this client's network (they haven't asked for it, and I as their current IT wouldn't recommend it if they did).
I thought that that WAS what they were asking for as it is the only means of doing the thing that they requested. Requesting web monitoring and filtering, and demanding the end users (guests) install a cert are one and the same in this case.
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@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@jaredbusch said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
Most common people will simply get the portal, tap anything it says and thus agree to it all. So yeah, you are wrong that no one does it.
Is that all that it takes to get the phone or computer to install the certs and hand over man in the middle access? I've not done it, because... only a crazy person would.... but I thought it took several steps and a lot of warnings from most mobile devices.
Yeah - there are a few warnings... but most people will simply accept it and start surfing - it's crazy... they have no clue what they are giving up. and even worse a surprising number wouldn't care even if you got them to actually understand it.
I think even if you carefully document it, you are at huge risk. Any banking breach, and you get blamed. Good luck proving you didn't use all the data you captured.
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
but SSL inspection on guest - nope, not interested... Hell I'd be more worried about being sue for breach of privacy.
Well you CAN'T do it without seriously breaking the law (and pulling some magic super computing stuff.) It's federally criminal to attempt without the customer voluntarily handing over their computer to you which absolutely no one will do. And it's a lot of work for someone just sitting in an office trying to watch porn.
You missed the reality of what I was saying -
I've been on guest wifi networks that sent you to a captive portal and required you to install their SSL cert so you could surf, and they could intercept all your traffic.
I was saying I was unwilling to make that a requirement on this client's network (they haven't asked for it, and I as their current IT wouldn't recommend it if they did).
I thought that that WAS what they were asking for as it is the only means of doing the thing that they requested. Requesting web monitoring and filtering, and demanding the end users (guests) install a cert are one and the same in this case.
no - web filtering simply based on DNS query was MY thinking on the guests.
SSL interception would only be for employee devices.
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So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
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@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
Firewalls are an inappropriate place for that kind of filtering and it makes me question the quality of a firewall that starts to act like a general purpose server platform. If they don't think that a security device should be single purpose, are they really prepared to be your security vendor?
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
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@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
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@travisdh1 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
Yes, they have a lot of new stuff beginning 2020. For instance a VPN solution, web application firewall etc. Some thing you need to pay for some but some that are free, depending on how many users etc.
They want to be everywhere on the edge for all traffic. Not just a DNS provider and a CDN solution.
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@travisdh1 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
Apparently so -
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network -
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@travisdh1 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
Yes, they have a lot of new stuff beginning 2020. For instance a VPN solution, web application firewall etc. Some thing you need to pay for some but some that are free, depending on how many users etc.
They want to be everywhere on the edge for all traffic. Not just a DNS provider and a CDN solution.
I use their VPN. Helps a lot down here.
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@travisdh1 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
Yes, they have a lot of new stuff beginning 2020. For instance a VPN solution, web application firewall etc. Some thing you need to pay for some but some that are free, depending on how many users etc.
They want to be everywhere on the edge for all traffic. Not just a DNS provider and a CDN solution.
I use their VPN. Helps a lot down here.
helps? in what way?
do a lot of US based service block you because in SA? -
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@travisdh1 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@pete-s said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
So the long and the short of it is - Scott is saying - no filtering is worth it, either on the employee side or the guest side.
i.e. the firewall is not a place to provide filtering (via either IP blocking or DNS website blocking) - there is not enough value if it has any cost.
Doing something simplish like Cloudflare's DNS filtering is worthwhile because there's no cost.
Yeah, I think that something simple like CloudFlare or even PiHole (or combine the two) can have good value because the cost is low and the value is basic.
You don't need any PiHole. You can set up DNS filtering policies on your free cloudflare account.
Just block every kind of external DNS queries in the firewall/router. Set the router to forward DNS to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1. Cloudflare will detect your IP and filter your DNS results based on your policies.
https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/tutorials/secure-dns-network
I haven't played with it yet but there seems to be a lot of filtering options.
Custom filtering without cost? That's news to me. I've known about the 1.1.1.2/1.0.0.2 and 1.1.1.3/1.0.0.3 options of course.
Yes, they have a lot of new stuff beginning 2020. For instance a VPN solution, web application firewall etc. Some thing you need to pay for some but some that are free, depending on how many users etc.
They want to be everywhere on the edge for all traffic. Not just a DNS provider and a CDN solution.
I use their VPN. Helps a lot down here.
helps? in what way?
do a lot of US based service block you because in SA?Yes, US services block non-US addresses very often, including things like the ability to pay taxes or deal with courts. But it also just smooths our services and ensures you get good DNS results.
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@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
Of course it's really only worthwhile where we can do SSL inspection (can this be down without installing certs on the clients to allow MiTM inspection?)
Nope, that's physically impossible. These types of devices I see as reckless because they are often poorly maintained, often made by questionable vendors (Sophos is fine, but many others are less respectable) and provide a single point of total egress of your data with nearly all assumed protections removed.
Hey Scott, can you elaborate a bit more on that - I'm talking about the recklessness of SSL inspection. I ask because my company has a Sonicwall NSA appliance and in the past I have attempted using the "DPI-SSL" feature (deep packet inspection) which required installing the Sonicwall cert on all systems and then the traffic would be intercepted and inspected. Despite me following their guide and applying the correct settings and site exceptions, I still had some issues and ended up scrapping the effort for now. I already know your opinion on Sonicwall but I just wanted to get more insight into the whole deep packet inspection effort.
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@dave247 said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@scottalanmiller said in New customer - greenfield setup:
@dashrender said in New customer - greenfield setup:
Of course it's really only worthwhile where we can do SSL inspection (can this be down without installing certs on the clients to allow MiTM inspection?)
Nope, that's physically impossible. These types of devices I see as reckless because they are often poorly maintained, often made by questionable vendors (Sophos is fine, but many others are less respectable) and provide a single point of total egress of your data with nearly all assumed protections removed.
Hey Scott, can you elaborate a bit more on that - I'm talking about the recklessness of SSL inspection. I ask because my company has a Sonicwall NSA appliance and in the past I have attempted using the "DPI-SSL" feature (deep packet inspection) which required installing the Sonicwall cert on all systems and then the traffic would be intercepted and inspected. Despite me following their guide and applying the correct settings and site exceptions, I still had some issues and ended up scrapping the effort for now. I already know your opinion on Sonicwall but I just wanted to get more insight into the whole deep packet inspection effort.
So my issue with that is that it "breaks" the entire security chain. The idea behind the certificate system is that your traffic is encrypted end to end. By adding a man in the middle there is a time when the traffic is not encrypted, but both the browser and the server believe that it is.
If everything works as expected, this is fine because we trust the man in the middle, in this case. But that's asking a lot of "another system" to be completely trusted.
In reality neither of the end points truly trust the man in the middle. The "firewall" isn't a friend here, it's in the path because it already distrusts both end points. So trust is not really appropriately at play here.
On a technology side, this adds an extremely high profile target that is rarely secured close to as well as the server or the workstations are. Traditionally firewalls were an extra layer of security, rather than an extra layer of risk. A compromised firewall meant that you lost a layer of defense, not that the firewall represented a bypass to existing security measures as well. So this ends up being a lot like a VPN, everyone says it's for security, but as used it is nearly always a huge risk because risk is extended rather than the tool being used to lock it down more.
So both hard technical by adding a huge point of exposure and for bypassing existing controls; and soft technical by putting the most critical point of exposure where network admins tend to understand it the least and where politics tend to keep it from getting properly maintained.
Then comes liability. Legally you can use this in most circumstances. But only most. I would never use this without my legal team signing off on it. Because you are hijacking encrypted data mid-stream that is meant to be trusted you risk both political fallout (customers, vendors, etc. being angry or going public that data may have been hijacked - possibly without consent) and legal fallout (if this is discovered and HIPAA data was in flight, for example, it technically violated any end to end encryption laws or requirements.) Knowing decrypting network traffic midway carries a lot of risk and you really need to understand the legal or business risk to all of the traffic. It's not something you can just do and not worry about.
As a business owner, never ever would I take that risk. Huge risk, no real value to doing so. I'd have to be a seriously emotionally driven control freak to consider doing something like this.
Which brings the final problem with it... a tool like this would not be made by or deployed by those who value security. So if you have a vendor making these tools, or you have management demanding these tools, you have people who are prioritizing control or the emotional perception of control above business interests and security. Sure, a vendor like SonicWall is just catering to their client base. To them it is a good business decision, but that decision is to allow their customers to undermine their own security. So from a security perspective, this goes against all common sense and otherwise stated practices.
As an aside, IF something like this was ever warranted, it should never be put on the firewall but run in a VM like any other production workload. That people put it on the firewall instead shows how little security thinking is involved when these products are discussed. There are better ways to do this if someone actually intended to do it in a good way.
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If this was a medical office, as an example, imagine if a client claimed that security had been compromised. Any investigation would quickly turn up that the end to end encryption rules were violated and that the office had intentionally removed encryption and exposed the data and had an opportunity for people, anyone with access to the firewall, to extricate it outside of the known controls.
While unlikely to be the actual source of a breach, in court it would really only need to be shown that the data was voluntarily exposed and that would be enough for damage to be done. But if you did want to steal HIPAA data, this is exactly the kind of exposure point you'd hope for. Especially as a great many firewalls that offer this have backdoors or weak security that would normally border on being useless when used properly, but when configured as a trusted man in the middle means you have a way to siphon out the data without detection after the network monitoring controls are already past. Nothing on the network would be able to detect large volumes of data flowing out as it was flow out from the outside interface of the LAN only.
