Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
Mainly it disables two old and insecure protocols. So no, it doesn't solve anything, but it makes things ever so slightly more difficult for the hackers (how long does it take them to switch from IMAP/POP to ActiveSync?).
What's insecure about them? IMAP/S is just as secure as ActiveSync or HTTPS. Identical, in fact. I'm not sure what about them makes people feel that they are insecure... the fragility of all four is the username / password. None of them vary in security.
Didn't say anything about IMAP or POP3 over SSL / TLS. I don't know about you, but I like my login information encrypted when I'm broadcasting it for the world to see.
-
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
Mainly it disables two old and insecure protocols. So no, it doesn't solve anything, but it makes things ever so slightly more difficult for the hackers (how long does it take them to switch from IMAP/POP to ActiveSync?).
What's insecure about them? IMAP/S is just as secure as ActiveSync or HTTPS. Identical, in fact. I'm not sure what about them makes people feel that they are insecure... the fragility of all four is the username / password. None of them vary in security.
Didn't say anything about IMAP or POP3 over SSL / TLS. I don't know about you, but I like my login information encrypted when I'm broadcasting it for the world to see.
Yes, but the assumption is that it is always over SSL. Web Interface is all that was mentioned, do we not assume HTTPS? If so, why in one case and not the other? And the broadcasting of creds isn't a factor here.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
Mainly it disables two old and insecure protocols. So no, it doesn't solve anything, but it makes things ever so slightly more difficult for the hackers (how long does it take them to switch from IMAP/POP to ActiveSync?).
What's insecure about them? IMAP/S is just as secure as ActiveSync or HTTPS. Identical, in fact. I'm not sure what about them makes people feel that they are insecure... the fragility of all four is the username / password. None of them vary in security.
Didn't say anything about IMAP or POP3 over SSL / TLS. I don't know about you, but I like my login information encrypted when I'm broadcasting it for the world to see.
Yes, but the assumption is that it is always over SSL. Web Interface is all that was mentioned, do we not assume HTTPS? If so, why in one case and not the other? And the broadcasting of creds isn't a factor here.
If it's not specifically stated, I try to assume nothing. Admittedly, I did assume HTTPS for the web site. If I see POP / IMAP, I immediately think clear text on port 110 or 143.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
One less attack vector I suppose. They could still hammer the web interface.
Any unused protocol should be shut down, certainly. But it's that they are unused, not that they are what they are.
I fully agree with this. Shut down and blocked at the site's Firewall.
-
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
Mainly it disables two old and insecure protocols. So no, it doesn't solve anything, but it makes things ever so slightly more difficult for the hackers (how long does it take them to switch from IMAP/POP to ActiveSync?).
What's insecure about them? IMAP/S is just as secure as ActiveSync or HTTPS. Identical, in fact. I'm not sure what about them makes people feel that they are insecure... the fragility of all four is the username / password. None of them vary in security.
Didn't say anything about IMAP or POP3 over SSL / TLS. I don't know about you, but I like my login information encrypted when I'm broadcasting it for the world to see.
Yes, but the assumption is that it is always over SSL. Web Interface is all that was mentioned, do we not assume HTTPS? If so, why in one case and not the other? And the broadcasting of creds isn't a factor here.
If it's not specifically stated, I try to assume nothing. Admittedly, I did assume HTTPS for the web site. If I see POP / IMAP, I immediately think clear text on port 110 or 143.
That's not been a standard for a long time, especially on Zimbra. We run Zimbra and only expose IMAP/S and HTTPS. Works really well. Since you have to open the ports manually, one assumes extra ones are not enabled.
-
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
One less attack vector I suppose. They could still hammer the web interface.
Any unused protocol should be shut down, certainly. But it's that they are unused, not that they are what they are.
I fully agree with this. Shut down and blocked at the site's Firewall.
Done and done. POP3 was disabled eons ago. IMAP/IMAPS officially is no longer available externally. Only the following ports are allowed inbound from the outside:
25
443
465
587Although, do I need 465/587? All MTA to MTA should be through 25, right?
-
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
One less attack vector I suppose. They could still hammer the web interface.
Any unused protocol should be shut down, certainly. But it's that they are unused, not that they are what they are.
I fully agree with this. Shut down and blocked at the site's Firewall.
Done and done. POP3 was disabled eons ago. IMAP/IMAPS officially is no longer available externally. Only the following ports are allowed inbound from the outside:
25
443
465
587Although, do I need 465/587? All MTA to MTA should be through 25, right?
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
One less attack vector I suppose. They could still hammer the web interface.
Any unused protocol should be shut down, certainly. But it's that they are unused, not that they are what they are.
I fully agree with this. Shut down and blocked at the site's Firewall.
Done and done. POP3 was disabled eons ago. IMAP/IMAPS officially is no longer available externally. Only the following ports are allowed inbound from the outside:
25
443
465
587Although, do I need 465/587? All MTA to MTA should be through 25, right?
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
Ok. Now the only ports open inbound from the outside are 25 and 443.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
-
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Hmm. Something to think about I suppose. Though I want to make sure I balance security vs complexity.
-
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
-
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Hmm. Something to think about I suppose. Though I want to make sure I balance security vs complexity.
Not really complex at all. It's generally considered a minimum component for running email. The Email Laundry would be a good place to start. They are here in the community and do exactly this.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
What about doing a Zimbra multi-server install and installing the MTA on one VM and the rest of the services on another VM?
-
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@dafyre said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I'm going to echo @StorageNinja's comments about POP3 and / or IMAP -- disable them and force folks to use the ActiveSync setup and/or the Webmail.
Does that solve anything? Same issues.
One less attack vector I suppose. They could still hammer the web interface.
You could always setup a reverse proxy server in front of the web interface. I don't think I have any websites, big or small that isn't behind a web proxy server.
-
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
What about doing a Zimbra multi-server install and installing the MTA on one VM and the rest of the services on another VM?
Not a bad idea, but doesn't provide you with enterprise mailbagging. It would in no way eliminate the best practice of having an HA hosted mailbagging system.
-
I use AppRiver to filter all of my incoming email. Only allow external access via port 25 from them.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
What about doing a Zimbra multi-server install and installing the MTA on one VM and the rest of the services on another VM?
Not a bad idea, but doesn't provide you with enterprise mailbagging. It would in no way eliminate the best practice of having an HA hosted mailbagging system.
Right. After I replied I realized what you meant by not accepting mail directly yourself....ha.
I have been considering diving into a multi-server deployment at some point. I've been considering putting the mailbox service on it's own hosts for performance reasons, but maybe instead I can organize services by publicly facing/not publicly facing and do two VMs that way.
In no way does this help in the scenario of the OP, though.
-
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
What about doing a Zimbra multi-server install and installing the MTA on one VM and the rest of the services on another VM?
Not a bad idea, but doesn't provide you with enterprise mailbagging. It would in no way eliminate the best practice of having an HA hosted mailbagging system.
Right. After I replied I realized what you meant by not accepting mail directly yourself....ha.
I have been considering diving into a multi-server deployment at some point. I've been considering putting the mailbox service on it's own hosts for performance reasons, but maybe instead I can organize services by publicly facing/not publicly facing and do two VMs that way.
In no way does this help in the scenario of the OP, though.
Just got to a larger VM in most cases. Separating them rarely will speed it up until you are going to lots of separate hardware.
-
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@anthonyh said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
@scottalanmiller said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
Correct, MTA is always on 25 unless you have an agreement with someone. Then it could be anything.
I'm a bigger fan of having an external service or device (that can mailbag) do your filtering, and then you only accept SMTP with TLS from that service (So your firewall rules don't allow port 25 from the world to the actually mail back end).
Yup, agreed. You never really want to be accept email directly yourself (on your email server, at least.)
What about doing a Zimbra multi-server install and installing the MTA on one VM and the rest of the services on another VM?
Not a bad idea, but doesn't provide you with enterprise mailbagging. It would in no way eliminate the best practice of having an HA hosted mailbagging system.
Right. After I replied I realized what you meant by not accepting mail directly yourself....ha.
I have been considering diving into a multi-server deployment at some point. I've been considering putting the mailbox service on it's own hosts for performance reasons, but maybe instead I can organize services by publicly facing/not publicly facing and do two VMs that way.
In no way does this help in the scenario of the OP, though.
Just got to a larger VM in most cases. Separating them rarely will speed it up until you are going to lots of separate hardware.
I've seen a single VM handle 5000 users just fine (With Exchange). For Zimbra I can't imagine what the point of separating them out is unless it has functionality similar to DAG.
Also to be blunt, why on earth are you manually reading the logs for this stuff? This is a colossal waste of manpower. For security auditing, you should...
- Outsource this. There are a lot of great SOC/IDS systems.
- Have an IDS layer 7 devices and reverse proxy manage a lot of this or you. (You shouldn't need to be tweaking brute force detection on different systems).
- If you care about security stop running your own email server. Pay someone who has dedicated SOC teams, patch management teams, massive spends on layer 7 inspection devices etc.
- If you work for a F500 you might have a internal SOC, but if you do this you basically are dedicated to this.
- Invest in internal security (MicroSegmentation and security inspection). Most of your DC traffic (~70%) is east wast and focusing on the external means your likely missing the real attacks as the control channel will be encrypted and tough to find on the stuff coming in north south.
When I worked in consulting, people who were wasting time chasing down hits on their firewall were generally the people looking for a new job a bit later.
-
@storageninja said in Malicious Logins To Zimbra Mail Server:
I've seen a single VM handle 5000 users just fine (With Exchange). For Zimbra I can't imagine what the point of separating them out is unless it has functionality similar to DAG.
Right, many thousands of users from a single VM would make sense. Just give it more cores and more RAM until it can handle what is needed. Splitting out to another VM would only be useful if you are also adding more physical resources between the two as well, like one is on one server and one is on another and each have dedicated CPUs. Otherwise, the network connection between them just presents an extra, and unnecessary, bottleneck.
